highlighted the inherent problems of the multilateral trading system and are likely to push many countries to divert their negotiating energies into regional trade agreements.
In this backdrop of resurgent regionalism, this paper gives an overview on Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs) and their interaction with the multilateral trading system.
II. Regional Trade Agreements: Basic Issues
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are defined as groupings of countries which are formed with the objective of reducing barriers to trade between member countries. Contrary to what the name suggests, these groupings or unions may be concluded between countries not necessarily belonging to the same geographical region.
Depending upon their level of integration, RTAs can be broadly divided into five categories: Apart from these shallow arrangements there are two types of regional agreements which provide "deep integration". The first 'deep integration' stage is called Common Markets, where member countries attempt to harmonize some institutional arrangements and commercial and financial laws and regulations among themselves. A common market also entails free movements of factors of production, i.e. removal of controls on free movement of labour and capital. The final 'deep integration' level is the 'Economic Union' where countries implement common economic policies and regulations and adopt a single currency. The relationship between the various levels of regional agreements is depicted graphically in figure 1. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3
Source: WTO Website (www.wto.org) WTO (2003) 5 highlights that in the current wave of regional agreements, two broad trends are emerging. Many countries which traditionally relied on the multilateral trade regime are increasingly joining regional agreements to promote trade. A second important trend is that a number of continent-wide mega trade blocks like the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) or the Euro-Mediterranean FTA are under negotiation. Once these negotiations are finalized, a significant share of global trade flow will be diverted through these trade blocks.
III. Why Countries are going for Regional Trade Agreements
To explain this rapid growth of RTAs since the 1990s, economists have tried to identify the economic and political reasons which are pushing countries towards increased regionalism. These explanations can be divided into three broad categories. First is the traditional explanation of welfare effects through trade liberalization and the consequent gains from trade at a regional level. showed that the net effect of trade liberalization on a regional basis is not unambiguously positive.
Viner pointed out that RTAs can lead to trade creation if, due to the formation of the regional agreement, RTA members switch from inefficient domestic producers and import more from efficient producers from other members of the RTA. In this case, efficiency gains arise from both production efficiency and consumption efficiency. On the other hand, trade diversion takes place if, because of the RTA, members switch imports from low-cost production in the rest of the world and import more from higher-cost producers in the partner countries. Trade diversion lowers welfare of not only the partner countries but the rest of the world also. In Viners's own words:
"…where the trade-diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the member countries is bound to be injured, the two combined will suffer a net injury, and there will be injury to the outside world and to the world at large." (Viner, 1950, p. 44) This analysis shows that trade creation and trade diversion have opposite welfare implications and the net effect will depend upon which of these two effects dominate. However, Viner did not unequivocally establish the net welfare effect of RTAs.
Viner's analysis was done on a static and partial equilibrium framework. Subsequently a number of studies tried to address the net welfare effects of RTAs by introducing dynamic effects into the model 7 . A number of papers have also looked at these issues in a multi-country general equilibrium framework (Lipsey 1970) . However, even with these analytical advances, the net welfare effect of RTAs, on an ex ante basis, remains theoretically ambiguous.
This ambiguity has led to a big debate among the trade theorists about the relative dominance of these two effects. A group of economists led by Summers (1991) 8 are of the opinion that regional trade agreements are likely to be more welfare enhancing because according to them, trade diversion is only likely to have a benign impact on the member countries. Lipsey (1957) 9 and
Summers also argue that if the member countries are geographically proximate and have very high trade dependence among each other (Natural Trading Partners), then the risk of trade diversion is minimal. Expressing similar views, Krugman (1991) 10 is of the opinion that the beneficial effect of a regional trade agreement will depend on whether there is enough 'inherent regionalism' in the transport costs between the member countries of the RTA. Frankel (1997) 11 , Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) 12 , Frankel and Wei (1997) 13 have also expressed similar views.
This view has been contested by Bhagwati (1995) 14 , 15 and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) 16 . According to these authors, trade diversion is more likely to dominate trade creation in most situations. They argue that when trade is multilateral, i.e. when countries import from and export to union members as well as outside countries, trade diversion is inevitable. Also, if members of the regional trade agreement are small in relation to the outside world, very little trade creation will take place. As a result, under these conditions, trade diversion is likely to be the more dominant effect.
7 For a survey of the literature on trade creation and trade diversion, see Lloyd and MacLaren (2003) 8 Summers, L.,( 1991) Mercosur has lead to trade diversion, it has helped to preserve employment within the Southern cone countries.
III. 2. Dissatisfaction with the Current Multilateral Trade Regime
The traditional analysis of regional trade agreement does not explain why there has been a sudden increase in regionalism during the 1990s. There is an emerging consensus among economists that frustration with the multilateral trading system is one of the prime reasons behind the current growth of regionalism. In 1993, answering a question about "what are the problems of the GATT that lead countries to turn to their neighbourhood", Krugman (1993) 17 suggests that countries find regionalism an easier alternative because large number of participants in multilateral trade negotiations reduces the cost of non-cooperation and creates rigidity in the system. Also according to him, modern trade barriers are much more complicated to negotiate in a multilateral forum and most countries find it easier to deal with these issues on bilateral or regional level.
In the post Uruguay Round era the concerns about the multilateral trading system have intensified.
Most countries, particularly developing countries are dissatisfied with the progress of WTO because most of the promises of the Uruguay Round agreement to expand global trade has not materialized in practice. Particularly for developing countries, the promised expansion of trade in three key areas of agriculture, textiles and services has been dismal. Moreover, incipient protectionism and lack of willingness among developed countries to provide market access on a multilateral basis has prompted many developing countries to look for regional alternatives. The
North-South divide which is appearing in the WTO ministerial meets is strengthening the apprehension of developing countries about the prospect of trade expansion under the WTO regime. This has induced many countries to adopt regionalism as an alternate option for expanding their markets. It is not surprising that there has been a sharp increase in the formation of regional trade agreements after the failure of Seattle Ministerial meet of WTO. 
III.3. Bandwagon Effect of Regionalism

III.4. The Other Factors
Among other important economic factors which are propagating regionalism today are foreign direct investment and the advantages associated with economies of scale. According to the World Trade Report 2003, preferential access to large regional markets is one of the key determinants of FDI in developing countries. As FDI has become the most important source of foreign capital inflow for developing countries, the WTR 2003 suggests that countries join RTAs to attract FDI.
On somewhat similar reasons, it has also been suggested that smaller countries join RTAs because it can offer domestic firms the advantage of economies of scale. However, this argument does not make the case in favor for regionalism as opposed to multilateralism.
Ghosh (2004) 22 provides another angle to this debate and argues that there is a marked difference in motivation between the RTAs which are initiated and pushed through by the major developed country governments and attempts to forge trading blocs within developing countries. According to her, developed countries, particularly USA and EU are pushing regional trade agreements, under the influence of large capital, to force developing countries make deeper trade and investment commitments than is now possible given multilaterally given the divisions in the WTO. On the other hand, the real motivating factor for developing countries to forge regional grouping among themselves is to resist the hegemony of large powers in world trade.
Political factors also motivate countries to join RTAs. Trade linkages between economies can increase the cost of conflict and improve cross border cooperation. Due to this reason, RTAs are used as a strategic move to consolidate peace and increase regional security among member countries. RTAs are often used by developed countries to forge geopolitical alliances and build up diplomatic ties. By providing increased discriminatory access to a larger market, these countries seek to garner increased support on political front. It is apparent that most political RTAs are not driven by economics, however, in the political RTA arrangements, particularly where a large developed is involved, there is always the possibility that the interests of smaller countries would be of secondary concern.
IV. Regionalism in the Current Global Trade System
Apart from the debate about the reasons behind the recent surge in regionalism, there is another big debate in the current international trade literature about whether regionalism can help or hinder the multilateral trading system. The question is, to use Bhagwati's famous terminology, whether regional trading blocks are "building blocks" or "stumbling blocks" of the multilateral trading system. There are opposing views among economists about the role of regionalism in the current global trade system. Krugman (1991) and Summers (1991) are of the opinion that regional trade blocs are welfare improving in nature and are unlikely to have any negative impact on the multilateral trade system. According to Summers, if the world is divided into a small number of trade blocks, multilateral negotiation will be easier as it will remove the free riders from the system. However, as Panagariya (1998) points out, this argument is questionable because it is not clear why FTAs will have an effect on the number of participants in the multilateral trading system. This is because, unlike Customs Unions, FTA members retain their own external trade barriers and therefore, in a multilateral platform, they negotiate these tariffs individually.
Secondly, though the countries belonging to the European Union have participated as a single unit in multilateral trade negotiations, its impact on the progress of these negotiations is questionable.
According to Panagariya, EU's preoccupation with its internal problems and agenda has, in fact, hindered the progress of multilateral trade negotiations.
Along with Krugman and Summers, Baldwin (1997) 23 , Ethier (1998) 24 and Lawrence (1999) 25 also do not see regionalism as a threat to the multilateral trading system. According to Baldwin, because trade is "already quite free in major trading nations, few regional liberalizations are capable of creating anti-liberalization forces". Therefore, he concludes that most regional trade agreements will weaken the opponents of trade liberalization and hence will promote and foster multilateral trade liberalization. Similar views have been expressed by Lawrence also. However, Baldwin accepts that his logic might not work for South-South FTAs and the consequences of these trade blocks might be different from what he has suggested. suggests that that the current form of regionalism do not anyway threaten multilateral liberalism and, in fact, is a direct consequence of multilateralism. He also argues that countries use regionalism as a stepping stone for entering the multilateral trading system and therefore, according to him, regionalism is not going to harm the multilateral trading system.
But the dominant view among mainstream economists suggests that regionalism is harmful for the multilateral trading system. For example, Bhagwati (1992 26 , Bhagwati and Krueger (1995) 27 and Bhagwati and Panagariya (2003) 28 think that preferential trade agreements are essentially discriminatory in nature and they view the drift towards PTAs as a serious threat to the multilateral trading system. According to Bhagwati and Krueger, increased regionalism is dangerous because it not only leads to inter block trade wars and domination of small countries by bigger partners in the regional blocks but also because it reduces the enthusiasm for participation in the multilateral trade regime. These authors express strong concerns about the negative effects of growing regionalism and they worry that RTAs divert attention from the multilateral trading system. They argue that by their very design, most preferential agreements lead to trade discrimination and thereby harm the multilateral trading system. Bhagwati also argues that the growing number of PTAs may lead to a complex system of regulatory structures and preferences where market access for products in one particular country will vary widely depending on their alleged origin. This phenomenon, known also as the "spaghetti-bowl" problem, may lead to complexity and lack of transparency in the global trading system. Bhagwati and Panagariya (2003) argue that by pushing aggressive trade treaties on a bilateral basis, developed countries are weakening the power of developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations. In a PTA between a developed and a developing country, the developed country often manages to include aggressive trade liberalization clauses, investment protection clauses and extraneous issues in the treaty. Having abandoned objections about these issues on a bilateral level, the developing country cannot resist these issues on a multilateral platform. This not only helps 27 Bhagwati, J. and A. Krueger (1995) Given the failure of WTO, it is clear that for developing countries the choice is between a multilateral trading system which is extremely unbalanced and PTAs, mostly South-South PTAs, which help these countries to expand market access without compromising on national policy autonomy. Or, in other words, the comparison is really between two second-best situations -a multilateral trading system, which is lopsided in nature with preferential trade liberalization, which, theoretically, may be an inferior solution 29 . And between these two alternatives, it is not surprising that many developing countries are now looking for South-South preferential trade agreements to expand their market access. These RTAs are likely to be beneficial for developing countries because lower dependence on developed country markets will not only help these countries to resist the pressures of hegemonic economic powers but also it will help them forge and foster stronger South-South alliances at the multilateral trade negotiations. Given the fact that a clear North-South division has appeared in WTO, this is likely to have a strong impact on the multilateral trading system.
V. Conclusion
This paper gives an overview of the main issues associated with the contradiction between regionalism and multilateralism. As this survey shows, at a theoretical level, economists are divided over the desirability of regional trade agreement in a multilateral trade regime. Even after fifty years of debate, there is still no consensus about this issue. However, regionalism, with its advantages and drawbacks, is a reality of the current global trade regime. And given the economic and political situation of the current world order, the wave of regionalism is likely to intensify in near future. If the explosive growth of regionalism continues, then it is bound to have a detrimental impact on the WTO regime. If a very high proportion of global trade gets diverted through the regional route, WTO is bound to loose some of its relevance in the global trading system.
The survey of literature indicates that the explosive growth of regionalism in the 1990s happened mainly because of two reasons. Among developing countries, the growth in regionalism took place mostly due to the dissatisfaction with the multilateral trading system. Also, due to a host of political and economic reasons, major developed countries like USA have perused regionalism aggressively during the 1990s. Many economists believe that this has led to a bandwagon effect of regionalism as most countries wanted to be part of at least some major trade blocks.
Theoretically speaking, trade liberalization through regionalism does not offer the best solution.
However, in the current state of distorted multilateralism, regionalism has turned out to be one of the more viable alternatives for developing countries to expand their market access. In this context, South-South RTAs are particularly useful as they allow developing countries to expand their markets without having to bow before hegemonic powers. However, there are some obvious pitfalls with regionalism. Apart from the problems of trade diversion, the complex web of regional agreements can also introduce uncertainties and opacity in the global trade system. Secondly, the problems associated with unequal power structure and exploitation of smaller members by a bigger economic power can be more acute in a regional trade block. Also, it is always possible that if the world is divided in a few mega trade blocks, then the weakest countries will be marginalized.
